Editorial: With Bashar Al-Assad Gone, Syrians Now Have a Say in their Future (Open Access)
The unimaginable has happened. Bashar Al-Assad, one of the bloodiest criminals of the past decades, is finally gone.
After 12 days of fighting, the whole edifice that Hafez Al-Assad and his son had built over the past 54 years has finally crumbled. Now, not only have Syrians the right to dream of a better future, but also contribute to it.
One of the most extraordinary aspects of HTS’ onslaught is that it was largely the result of an action planned and implemented by Syrians, despite the largely internationalised nature of the conflict. The operation would not have taken place without a Turkish green light, but Syrian rebels needed no foreign tanks or air force to support them. The operation that rid Syria of its criminal tyrant ended up being one of the least violent phases of the war. The messaging from both the winners and the losers, or, rather, the communities that were supposed to fear most from the opposition, have been appeasing. And finally, as of today, exactions have remained limited although some reports emerging are of concern and require closer monitoring.
These are very important dimensions that Syrians must capitalise on to build their future, particularly because they are also, counter-intuitively, a result of the gigantic efforts made by Syrian civil society over the course of the past 13 years in structuring and institutionalising itself and in its work in documenting, monitoring, lobbying, and providing aid, among many other skills. It is no surprise that the first location rebel forces entered after seizing each city was not the seat of power in that city, but its prisons, such is the fate of prisoners a shared concern across Syrian society. And HTS soldiers, despite the ideological background of their organisation, did not filter any of those imprisoned by gender, religion or political affiliation. They simply set everybody free.
Now start the challenges.
First, a large question mark looms over the intentions of HTS and its leader, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, Syria’s de-facto-ruler. There is little doubt that both have changed in the past years. They have clearly been transformed by their governing of Idlib, its society and its contradicting interests, very simply by the constraints imposed on any politician that is in a position of ruling. But there are also little doubts about the ideological background of its leaders and the influence of many of the most radical members of the organisation. Already, a flag with the Islamic Shahada stands along the Syrian flag in the prime minister’s office. HTS does not want to export its Islamic principles outside the country, but it certainly does not want either to establish a liberal democracy.
Another major immediate challenge is the situation in the northeast. Turkey-affiliated militias have started attacking U.S. backed- Syrian Democratic Forces strongholds and while HTS has remained on the sidelines, at one point it will have to decide where it stands. The question over the political rights of the Kurdish population in Syria remains unanswered. Fundamentally, through this question, and many others, will be decided the new social pact that Syrians will have to agree on.
On the security side, the destruction in the past days by the Israeli air force of what remained of the Syrian army’s assets, including tanks, helicopters, planes and navy, despite that army not posing any challenge to Tel Aviv, will seriously undermine any effort to combat ISIS, secure borders or maintain security.
Add to this the fact that HTS has an army and an administration to rule and govern Idlib, not Syria. The organisation remains fundamentally under equipped, both militarily and through its civilian administration, to govern the whole of Syria. This has a very positive dimension in the sense that it will force it into compromise with other forces; but once these compromises are made there will remain the need to secure the country.
Another source of weakness is the absence of a clear successor to Mr Sharaa. Should anything happen to him, this would have consequences on the cohesion of HTS and more broadly the coalition of forces that fought with it. It would entail stability risks for the country.
The relation with regional and international powers is another important challenge. Any decision by U.S. president-elect Donald Trump to withdraw U.S. forces from Syria would have very serious humanitarian, political and security consequences on the country. Russia and Iran have possibly been largely sidelined, but that does not mean that they will not seek to regain influence. A modus vivendi will have to be reached with Turkey, while Gulf countries will want to have a say. Syria remains a very fragile and poor country, making foreign involvement much easier.
Also, for decades, Syrian journalists have been subjected to dire repression and censorship. Freedom of the press will be key in ensuring a future in a free Syria where the media holds accountable those in power.
Finally, the economic situation remains a major priority. Syria is a largely sanctioned country ruled by an organisation sanctioned by a separate set of regulations. Funding needs are enormous at a period of dwindling sources of money. Political change may bring many benefits, encourage the return of investors, and potentially draw additional funding. But the country’s infrastructure, public services and production capacity are largely broken, while its skilled labour force has mostly left the country.
But now is the moment to enjoy the new perspectives brought by the end of Assad’s rule. For the first time in many years, hope is returning among Syrians. This is best witnessed in the multiplication of political initiatives that have started to emerge barely hours after the fall of Damascus. Syrians are organising themselves again, signing petitions, thinking about which best ways to structure themselves. These are the signs of people who want to have a say in their country’s future, that is, people who view themselves again as citizens, after 54 years during which they saw themselves only as subjects.
