A Radiography of HTS Military and Governance Capabilities (Open access)
The lightning attack of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) in the past week and its success in capturing Aleppo and more than doubling the size of the area under its control highlight the significant strides HTS and its civilian arm, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), made in recent years in developing their military and governance capabilities: from producing drones, establishing a military academy, setting up a proto central banking entity, and issuing a weekly official gazette.
The timing, speed, multiple military equipment tactics such as the usage of drones, suggest an unprecedented level of preparation by HTS, marking a notable shift in the dynamics of the conflict.
While Turkey continues to maintain a military presence in northwest Syria, its level of involvement with or support for the HTS operation is uncertain.
HTS, led by Abu Mohammad Al-Joulani (nom de guerre of Ahmad Hussein Al-Sharaa), was established in early 2017 in Idlib through the merger of several Islamist groups opposing the regime, with the most prominent being Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham, previously known as Jabhat Al-Nusra (or Al-Nusra Front). Al-Nusra had been an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria since 2013, after it was established in 2012 as a branch of the Islamic State of Iraq (the predecessor of ISIS).
In July 2016, Abu Mohammad Al-Joulani severed links with Al-Qaeda, and later targeted the Al-Qaeda branch Hurras Al-Din.
The group led by Mr Al-Joulani “having largely decimated or co-opted the Free Syrian Army in 2017-2019, took the fight to Islamist factions such as Ahrar al-Sham and Nour al-Din al-Zenki,” read a report published by the European Council of Foreign Relations.
Gradually, HTS has tried to portray itself as a mainstream opposition group, also catering to the rights of minorities, such as Christians and Druze living in the area. HTS “has rebranded itself from a former transnational Salafi-Jihadi group to a more localized Islamist group,” according to the non-profit Armed Conflict Location & Event Data. The U.S., the E.U. and the U.N. have designated HTS as a terrorist organisation.
In late 2017, HTS established the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) as its civilian administration arm, with the aim of enhancing governance in the regions under its control.
Military preparations
Over the years, HTS has been actively enhancing its military capabilities, notably through the acquisition and deployment of advanced weaponry such as drones, and the strengthening and unification of its command structure.
The SSG announced the establishment of a military academy in October 2021. Aaron Y. Zelin, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute, told The Syria Report that the establishment of this military college was “a way of institutionalising all of the rebel groups that were under HTS control together, so all would be integrated and seamless.” As a consequence of these centralising efforts, “when they do fight, it is all together now, instead of one unit or that unit from a different rebel group,” he added.
In the offensive launched last week, HTS established the Command of Military Operations (CMO), the latest iteration of the previous coordination structure known as Joint Operations Room or Al-Fateh Al-Mubin. The transition from the Joint Operations Room to the CMO “has been done through these reforms via this military college that they developed,” Mr Zelin added.
The HTS preparations for the offensive launched last week were observed by local media months ago. In September, for example, Independent Arabia reported that HTS had intensified the training and preparation of its members in all units and brigades, with particular emphasis on special forces, communications, and drone command. Al-Araby TV had reported on similar intensive training around a year ago. In early October, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat reported on HTS efforts to fortify its positions, constructing defensive structures, and setting up ambush points.
A video published by the CMO on November 29 revealed a new HTS-commandos unit, called the ‘Red Bands,’ that has advanced night-vision military gear, enabling them to operate at night.
On November 27, the CMO, in its Telegram channel, announced that its drone battalion called Shaheen (Arabic for Falcon) targeted the regime’s military airport in Al-Neirab near Aleppo. Supported by several videos and photos shared on social media, this supports earlier reports from Northpress News Agency in February about an HTS drone factory.
Reports from international news outlets and social media accounts have highlighted HTS’ strategic deployment of FPV (First Person View) suicide drones, signalling a shift towards more advanced warfare tactics. This move to incorporate drone technology has been part of HTS strategy for years, with significant advancements in recent months.
In 2023, two drone attacks against the Syrian regime highlighted advancements in the use of this technology. The first, on October 6, targeted the Homs Military Academy, resulting in the deaths of 89 regime cadets and their families, along with 277 injuries. The second attack, on November 5, targeted the Iranian consulate in Aleppo. Although HTS did not claim responsibility, the Syrian regime and Russia, accused HTS in the two attacks and initiated a military campaign against HTS-controlled villages and towns in the Idlib and Aleppo countryside.
Last year, EnabBaladi reported on HTS efforts to restructure its military units to enhance mobility and effectiveness in combat scenarios, including creating specialised units like the “Inghimasi” or Immersive forces for shock attacks.
These developments collectively underline HTS’s commitment to evolve its military strategy, aiming to counterbalance the Syrian government’s advantages in artillery and air support.
Governance developments
Since the formation of the SSG in 2017, Idlib has witnessed a significant development in its civilian administration.
The SSG government, led since the beginning of this year by Prime Minister Mohammad Al-Bashir (who succeeded Ali Kadeh); comprises 11 portfolios: Agriculture and Irrigation, Economy and Resources, Health, Education, Development and Humanitarian Affairs, Local Administration and Services, Higher Education and Scientific Research, Interior, Justice, Information, and Religious Endowments.
The SSG has put in place a number of quasi state institutions that in many cases mirror those in government-held areas, even in their names: the General Transport Establishment, for example, is in charge of public transport; the General Establishment for Telecommunications regulates the telecom sector; while the Central Body for Supervision and Inspection monitors and supervises the SSG administration and the entities affiliated with it. Meanwhile, the Directorate of Cadastral Affairs manages land and property records.
In September 2023, the SSG announced plans to establish centralised municipalities aimed at improving the management of administrative units in Idlib. In 2021, it started organising urban areas by assigning official addresses to buildings and homes in Idlib.
The SSG issued compulsory ID cards in late 2022 and facilitated the use of the dollar among residents. The use of the Turkish lira and the dollar rather than the Syrian pound has brought a relative stability in prices and revenues.
The SSG established in 2020 a proto-central banking entity, supported by two financial institutions Sham Bank and Naqd Bank, which act as currency exchange and remittance services rather than conventional commercial or Islamic banks, primarily to facilitate HTS’s financial transactions.
In October 2022, the SSG ended the monopoly of HTS-affiliated companies in the oil sector, allowing several companies to sell oil products.
In 2022, SSG established a new telecom service provider, Syria Phone, which entered its pilot phase in 2023. It appears that it officially started operations in Idlib in July. This development, promoted by HTS as an alternative to Syriatel and MTN (both closely tied to the Presidential Palace) marks a significant milestone. However, the company remains vulnerable to attacks, for instance, on Monday, its branch in Idlib announced the suspension of operations due to airstrikes. Syria Phone set its prices in U.S. dollars when it was launched in Idlib.
In Sarmada, near the Bab Al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey, the SSG established the Bab Al-Hawa Industrial City, most projects being small in size, and built a new highway leading to the border crossing.
One of the most symbolic projects of the SSG is probably the issuance of a weekly official gazette, featuring official decisions, regulations, and announcements, including the establishment of new companies or the registration of trademarks. (You can browse through all the issues of the gazette published by the SSG on our Official Documents Database website, available for free here).
However, the HTS and SSG have also faced regular outbreaks of anger among residents. Earlier this year, for example, significant protests spread across Idlib against the dire economic conditions and HTS governance, accusing the group of despotic behaviour and corruption.
The Syrian Network of Human Rights, in a report published in 2022, documented “multiple types of human rights violations, mainly in its detention centers” committed by HTS. HTS follows a “calculated policy of persecution based on first summoning opposition activists, protesters, and critics of the Salvation Government’s policies for questioning in order to restrict their activities by coercion or intimidation,” according to the report. Syrians for Truth and Justice, a human rights organisation, in a report published in 2022, documented several violations against Christians and Druze communities in HTS-controlled areas of Idlib.
The protests earlier this year forced the appointment of a new prime minister and cabinet, and pushed the SSG to launch a series of security and governance measures. For instance, it reduced or eliminated certain real estate fees and formed a committee to draft an electoral law to elect the new members of the Shura Council, which was previously appointed by the HTS leadership.
Measures taken after the offensive
Following the HTS offensive launched last week, the SSG announced several measures that apply both inside SSG areas and in the areas that HTS has taken over in the last six days.
In a statement on November 29, Mr Bachir announced the “ability” of the SSG to govern the liberated areas. “Our institutions have become strong and cohesive, and have the tools to organise and manage all liberated areas, to ensure a safe and dignified return for all Syrians,” he said. Mr Bachir also announced the reactivation of the Emergency Response Committee to take necessary steps, including providing temporary housing for displaced people, activating ambulance systems, protecting people’s money and property, and establishing security in the region.
On November 29 , the CMO imposed a 24-hour curfew in Aleppo to “minimise risks to civilians amid ongoing tensions.” Exceptions were made for state employees and bakeries, allowing them to continue operations during the curfew period. The curfew has so far been extended on a daily basis. Other measures include:
- The CMO announced a digital currency wallet to receive donations, which aligns with ongoing fundraising campaigns in HTS-controlled areas.
- Minister of Information Mohammad Al-Omar invited local and international media to cover developments on the ground.
- Minister of Local Administration Mohammad Moslem pledged to enhance essential services like water and electricity.
- Prime Minister Bashir suspended education in private, state and SSG-run schools until December 7, including any educational institutions inside the “newly liberated areas” according to the statement.
- Health Minister Mazen Dukhan advised Aleppo residents to avoid large gatherings due to ongoing Russian and Syrian airstrikes.
- State bakery employees in Aleppo city were instructed to resume work to ensure a steady supply of bread.
- Minister of Development Fadi Al-Qasem announced the free distribution of 65,000 bread packs in newly “liberated” Aleppo areas, with Idlib bakeries donating 100,000 packs for Aleppo households.
- HTS provided Aleppo residents with a list of contact persons representing various ministers and companies within the SSG, responsible for operations in the governorate, in case they had requests or inquiries.
- On Monday, Syria Phone started installing new cell towers in three districts in Aleppo: New Aleppo, Al-Jamilieh, and on the Radio Building.
Messaging campaign
HTS has undertaken significant communication efforts since the beginning of the offensive. For instance, on November 29, it issued a message in Russian addressed to the Russian federation assuring it that it did not consider Moscow an enemy, in an apparent attempt to neutralise as much as possible Moscow’s intervention in the conflict. Similarly, on December 1, hours after the state news agency announced that Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad had called the Iraqi prime minister, another statement by HTS assured the Iraqi government and population that it sought to build “brotherly cooperation” with Iraq.
The CMO has also announced an “amnesty” for regime soldiers and police officers in Aleppo if they defect before December 6.
After HTS took over Aleppo city, Abu Mohammad Al-Joulani reassured Christians and other minorities that they would be safe under his rule. A similar message was later addressed to the Kurds. In the early hours after taking control of Aleppo, HTS members interviewed several Christians in their neighbourhoods and churches and filmed Christmas preparations. Through these messages, HTS aims to rebrand itself as a protector of minorities.
It is unclear how effective these propaganda messages are and whether they will suffice to reassure anyone, but they highlight the political acumen of Mr Joulani and his organisation. In recent days, reports have emerged of HTS arresting officers from other opposition groups for apparently looting some government entities, including the Aleppo power plant.
Moving forward, it remains unclear if HTS has the capability to manage a city as big as Aleppo. It is also unclear whether Aleppo’s residents accept the rule of an Islamist organisation that draws most of its resources and men from the countryside and suburban areas, two constituencies that the population of Aleppo, a very proud and multi-secular city, traditionally looks down on.
